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1. INTRODUCTION  
Conflict of interests among World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries have bogged down 
the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations on major issues such as agriculture, industrial 
tariffs and nontariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. Started in 2001 at Doha, the round has yet 
to yield a major agreement. The impasse is so serious that in April 2011, then the WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy "asked members to think hard about 'the consequences of throwing away ten 
years of solid multilateral work. "Although considerable time and effort has been spent on issues such 
as agriculture, a key focus of the Doha Round is development. Indeed, one of the few achievements 
of the Doha round is the duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access granted by developed countries 
to products from the least developed countries (LDCs). The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 
18 December 2005 says that 
“…developed-country Members, and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a 
position to do so, agree to implement duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating 
from LDCs ….” 
At the time of the declaration, the European Union had already begun to grant preferential tariffs to 
LDC countries under “Everything But Arms” initiatives, and the United States had been offering 
similar terms to Sub-Saharan African countries under the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). Japan started to grant zero tariffs to LDCs from around 2000 and accelerated the pace of 
this at around 2005.  
This study evaluates whether Japan's DFQF access has favourably affected LDC exports to Japan. 
Analysis is performed at the tariff line level by constructing concordance tables for 9-digit tariff line 
codes. While most evaluations of trade liberalisation policies, and especially of preferential trade 
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agreements, struggle with endogeneity, DFQF systems have an inherently low level of endogeneity 
because of their exogenous nature.1 
Literature 
In terms of the impact of the WTO-led trade liberalisation on the LDCs, previous literature has dealt 
almost exclusively with possible preference erosion for LDCs. When the Doha Round started in 
2001, its aims were across-the-board trade liberalisation. However, LDCs were afraid that the trade 
preferences they had been enjoying would be eroded as tariffs for other countries were decreased by 
Doha Round negotiation. In response to this fear, some economists used the Computable General 
Equilibrium model to study the potential effects of preference erosion; two such studies are Low, 
Piermartini, and Richtering (2006) and Carrère and de Melo (2009). However, the Doha Round is 
stalled, and across-the-board tariff liberalisation is far from being achieved. On the other hand, on 
the front of development issue of the Doha round, the developed countries agreed to grant duty-free 
quota-free access to the LDCs.2 By 2008, developed countries’ DFQF treatment for LDCs reached 
almost 100 percent product coverage. This has provided sufficient data for ex-post analysis. To the 
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to carry out an ex-post assessment of the DFQF 
treatment agreed in the Hong Kong ministerial declaration. One ex-post analysis of the effect of a 
system similar to the DFQF is the study by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010); their study 
examines the effect of the AGOA. However, AGOA’s tariff elimination scheme is different from 
the DFQF scheme in that AGOA is selective on both countries and products. Eligibility for AGOA 
requires a basic level of political and democratic freedom within the country. In terms of eligible 
                                               
1 See Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for example for the endogeneity issues related to the evaluation 
study of Preferential Trade Agreement. Various attempts to address the endogeneity issues are 
neatly and well explained in Egger, Egger and Greenaway (2008). 
2 An ex-ante analysis on potential benefits from preferential tariffs given to the LDCs by EU under 
EBA was done by Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2002); their analysis uses partial equilibrium 
simulation. They showed that EBA would induce larger exports from LDCs to the EU market at the 
expense of other developing countries. 
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products, “the AGOA legislation explicitly allows the president only to grant duty-free treatment for 
non-apparel articles ‘after the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission have determined that the article is not import sensitive when imported from African 
countries…’” (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010)). Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) mention 
this selection issue as a limitation in their study. 
2. DATA 
This paper uses Japan’s annual tariff data at the tariff line level (HS 9-digit code) from World 
Integrated Trade Solutions and the corresponding trade (import) data from Japan’s customs office. 
The period of study is from 1996 to 2014. The year 1996 was chosen as the starting year because 
Japan began to grant zero tariffs to LDCs from around the year 2000. More reasons for this choice 
of period are discussed later in the text. 
2.1. Tariff data 
It is important to include not only advalorem tariffs but also ad-valorem equivalent tariffs, which 
can be estimated for non-advalorem tariffs. Developed countries have been reducing the number of 
non-advalorem tariffs, the majority of which are specific tariffs, by changing them to advalorem 
tariffs in accordance with WTO member consensus. However, many non-advalorem tariffs remain 
in effect. Because the DFQF agreements cover essentially all tariff line codes, there are many tariff 
line codes for which tariffs have been eliminated for LDCs; however, non-advalorem tariffs remain 
in effect for the other countries. Thus, to evaluate the effects of the DFQF agreements, it is 
necessary to simulate advalorem equivalent tariffs to extant non-advalorem tariffs. For non-
advalorem tariffs, advalorem equivalent tariffs computed by UNCTAD 1 are used.3 
                                               
3 UNCTAD 1 is the first in a list of methods suggested by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development for computing ad valorem tariff equivalents. This method was chosen from 
among four suggested methods to calculate advalorem equivalent tariffs because UNCTAD 1 
produces advalorem equivalent tariffs for the largest number of tariff lines. 
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2.2. Concordance 
A major challenge arises when one attempts to perform analyses across highly disaggregated levels, 
such as the 9-digit level of this study. Since the Harmonised System (HS) (at the 6-digit level) 
changes on average every five years4, Japan’s 9-digit codes also change to remain in conformity 
with the HS.5 Thus, in order to track the same product (i.e., tariff line), we need to make 
concordance across codes in different years. Concordance lists of different (9-digit) HS codes are 
available from the Customs office, Ministry of Finance, Japan, but it is just concordance lists not 
concordance tables. Thus, we have created concordance tables for Japan’s 9-digit code lines by 
checking the obsolete-new concordance lists one at a time; this is almost certainly the first such 
attempt, one of our achievements in this study. Adjusting the algorism proposed by Schott and 
Pierce (2011) for the US customs codes to our dataset, we concord Japan’s 9-digit HS codes over 
years. The details for the need of concordance algorism and the procedures are in the appendix. If 
only those tariff line codes which have an identical code number throughout the years of 1996 to 
2014 are used, only 3564 codes out of total number of 9000 codes are left. By using the 
concordance tables we have constructed by the algorism, we can keep almost all codes. Some codes 
are still dropped. This is because some codes are intrinsically unable to be concorded for reasons 
such as the unknown goods and the ambiguously defined goods.  
2.3. Trade data 
Japan’s trade data cover all transactions at the 9-digit level whose amounts are more than or equal 
to 210000 yen (approximately 2100 US dollars) for all partner countries. Thus, these data cover 
most commercial trades of Japan. Taiwan is a major trading partner for Japan, and the data cover 
                                               
4 To be precise, the HS codes changed in 1992, 1996, 2002, 2007 and 2012. 
5 The first 6 digits are common across all countries (internationally harmonised), and further 
disaggregation is done individually by each country. Japan adds three more digits. 
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trade with Taiwan even though UN COMTRADE data do not cover Taiwan. Data at the 9-digit 
level are available from 1988. In the analyses that follow, the whole available period (1988–2014) 
was used when consistent tariff lines were not required, and the period of 1996–2014 was used 
when consistent tariff lines were required. The concordance has not been extended back to HS 1992 
or HS 1988 because the benefit to be gained by doing so is far exceeded by the cost of the 
extension. To extend the period covered by the concordances would necessitate construction of 
concordance tables for HS 1996 - HS 1992 and HS 1992 - HS1988. This would further unavoidably 
decrease the number of tariff lines to be studied due to intrinsically non-concordable lines between 
different HS versions. Briefly, a longer study period reduces the number of feasible tariff line codes. 
For the purposes of this study, extending the concordances offers little benefit because the change 
of the zero tariff lines took place in the period 1996–2011.  
3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section discusses descriptive properties of changes in the number of zero tariff lines by country 
group (according to tariff type), the evolution of import values by country group, preference 
margins, evolution of import values by preference margins, and the incidence of imports, by tariff 
line, from LDCs. 
3.1. Evolution of zero tariffs 
Figure 1 shows time-series of the total number of tariff lines whose tariffs are zero. Japan’s tariff can 
be grouped into four large categories: most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) tariffs; GSP tariffs applied to LDCs (LDC-GSP); and tariffs for free trade 
agreement (FTA) partners. MFN tariffs are imposed on most of Japan’s imports. For WTO members 
who are developing countries, Japan (and other developed countries) gives preferential tariffs under 
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the GSP. Among the major trading partners of Japan, China is a notable example of a GSP beneficiary. 
Under the DFQF system, LDCs receive the most preferential treatment.6 
The change to zero tariff lines for FTA partners is not shown in the figure. Although Japan has signed 
FTAs with several countries, tariff eliminations for FTA partners have either been completed only 
recently or are still in the process; moreover, Japan’s trade level with its FTA partners is still small. 
From Figure 1, it is evident that Japan accelerated the elimination of tariffs for LDCs shortly before 
2000, eliminated a substantial number of tariffs in 2001, and then in 2007 expanded the zero tariff 
lines to almost 100% of tariff lines. LDC countries currently enjoy about 3500 more zero tariff lines 
than GSP beneficiaries and about 5000 more zero tariff lines than MFN countries. As the total number 
of tariff lines is about 9000, this preference is substantial.  
=== Figure 1 === 
3.2. Import value by country group 
Import values by country group are shown in Figure2. The three main country groups are LDCs, GSP 
beneficiary countries, and the rest of the world (REST). REST is almost identical to MFN because 
almost all of Japan’s trading partners are WTO members. Russia is an exception. However, Russia 
ranks only 20th among import partners of Japan and accounts for only 1.52%, on average, of the 
import values in the period of study. Import value from LDCs is substantially lower than from the 
REST and GSP groups, so the value from LDCs is indicated by the right axis. The right axis has a 
much smaller scale than the left axis, which corresponds to the MFN and GSP groups. Import value 
from all country groups increased steadily until 2008; in 2009, the value decreased due to the trade 
collapse caused by the global financial crisis. It is worth noting that the growth of import value from 
LDCs between 2003 and 2008 is higher than from the MFN or GSP groups. Since the GSP group 
                                               
6 See the appendix for lists of GSP beneficiary countries and LDCs. 
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includes large and rapidly expanding BRIC countries (BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, and China; 
Russia is not in the GSP group),  Figure 3 shows import value with BRIC countries separately. The 
results with BRIC countries excluded (Figure 3) are qualitatively similar to the results with them 
included (Figure 2).  
=== Figure 2 & Figure 3 === 
3.3. Preference margins 
The LDCs enjoy a substantially larger number of zero tariff lines than other countries, and it is also 
important to examine the magnitude of the preference margins. The 9-digit tariff code which 
corresponds to the largest preference margin for LDCs is 121299190, “Tubers of konnyaku 
(Amorphophalus, whether or not cut, dried or powdered),” with a preference margin of 5537.27%. 
One hundred 9-digit tariff lines have preference margins of more than 100%. These extremely large 
preferences may enable LDCs to begin exporting the preferentially treated goods to the Japanese 
market. Table 1 shows the number of tariff line codes for which the preference margin exceeds 10% 
or 20%. For example, 1081 tariff line codes correspond to products for which LDCs have preference 
margins of more than 10% with respect to GSP beneficiary countries. 
=== Table 1 === 
Because goods from LDC are limited in scope (e.g., they do not produce sophisticated industrial 
goods), it is worth investigating which industries are subject to preference margins. As Table 2 shows, 
most products are in the Food industry or the Apparel and Textiles industry, in which the LDCs are 
likely to have comparative advantages. Thus, the DFQF system may have a large impact on LDC 
exports to the Japanese market. 
=== Table 2 === 
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3.4. Import value by country group and product group 
To identify the effect of the DFQF system, tariff line codes are divided into two groups. The treated 
group is the group of codes for which positive number of tariff rates were applied in 1996 but became 
zero by the year 2008.7 The non-treated group (control group) is the group of codes for which tariffs 
were already zero in 1996. By comparing import value between these two groups and across country 
group, we can see whether the DFQF system seems to have had a positive impact on LDCs’ exports 
to Japan. Figures 4 and 5 show the results for non-treated (control) group products and treated group 
products, respectively. For non-treated (control) group products, the import values from REST and 
the non-LDC GSP steadily increased from 2001 to 2008 whereas the import value from the LDCs 
increased only modestly in that period. After the drop in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, the 
import values from all the three country groups rose but especially from the LDCs. On the other hand, 
in the case of the treated group products, the import value from the LDCs steeply increased from 2001 
to 2008, more than from REST and much more than from the non-LDC GDP. After the drop in 2009, 
the import values from the rest of the world and the non-LDC GSP almost recovered the pre-financial 
crisis level by 2014, but that from the LDCs did not. The preference margins granted by the DFQF 
scheme seem to have a positive impact on LDC countries’ exports to Japan in 2001-2008, pre-
financial crisis, but the negative impact of the financial crisis lingered.  
=== Figure 4 & Figure 5 === 
3.5. Incidence of imports 
The previous section studies the import values, what the literature calls “intensive margins”. The 
DFQF system might also have induced some products to be exported for the first time, what the 
literature calls “extensive margins”. Because LDCs are small and very poor (on average, GDP per 
                                               
7The year 2008 was chosen because Japan's zero tariffication was almost completed by that year. 
Results when 2014 was used as the cutoff year were very similar. 
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capita of less than 905 US dollars), even a small amount of exports is important especially when a 
product is exported for the first time. Table 3 shows the number of tariff lines imported, counting 
duplicates, into the Japanese market by country group and by tariff line group. If two products are 
both imported into Japan from two countries, the number recorded is four (i.e., 2 ×2). If each of 116 
products is imported only from one country, the number is 116. As Table 3 show, within the treated 
lines, whereas the number changed little for REST (the rest of the world) and the number gradually 
increased for non-LDC GSP, the increase for the LDC is substantial. The number almost tripled over 
the years. These results indicate that the DFQF had a positive effect on the “extensive margin”. 
=== Table 3 === 
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
This section contains a quantitative analysis of the same data used in the descriptive analysis of 
section 3. This is a case of the program evaluation in the econometrics literature. The program 
evaluation is usually expressed in the following equation.  
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 01 1 1E Y Y D E Y D E Y D− = = = − =  
The left-hand side is the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT). The first term in the right-
hand side is the mean value (import value in our study) for the countries or products selected; the 
rightmost term contains the mean value for the country or product as if it had not been selected. That 
is, the rightmost term is the counterfactual. The first term in the right-hand side is observable, but the 
second term is not. If ( ) ( )0 01 0E Y D E Y D= = =  holds, then ordinary least squares estimation will 
yield an unbiased estimate. If this equality does not hold, then endogeneity as a consequence of 
selection becomes a problem; this necessitates careful handling of endogeneity. However, a complete 
solution of the endogeneity issue is almost always a difficult task, due to unavailability of good 
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instrumental variables which satisfies various conditions for good IVs, such as high correlation with 
the variables to be instrumented or the exclusion restrictions. 
Most program evaluation studies examine programs with endogenously given criteria, such as impact 
studies of preferential trade agreements. LDC status, however, is exogenously decided. Specifically, 
Japan did not choose which countries are eligible for the DFQF program. Japan is required to grant 
DFQF treatment to all LDCs. Tariff lines to be liberalised are also not selected. Thus, the DFQF 
system has the virtue of being almost free from the endogeneity issue. This makes OLS an appropriate 
estimation method for this study.  
We apply the triple difference estimator (i.e., difference-in-difference-in-difference), as is done by 
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010). The estimation model is:  
0 1 2
3 4
Im * * Pr
Pr Pr
ijt t i j it
jt ij ijt
portValue Ineffect LDC Treated oduct CountryPeriod
oductPeriod Country oduct
β β β
β β ε
= + +
+ + +

   
For triple difference analysis, the time dimension (year) is collapsed into two periods: one for the 
years from 1996 to 2000; the other for the years from 2001 to 2014. This allows the analysis to fully 
exploit the exogenous nature of Japan's DFQF system since the zero tariffication was gradually done 
from 2001 onward. The variable of interest is the triple interaction term, 
* * Prt i jIneffect LDC Treated oduct . Here, tIneffect is a dummy variable which switches from 0 to 1 
for all countries and products after 2001; iLDC is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
importer is an LDC country and 0 otherwise; Pr jTreated oduct  is a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 for those products that are treated in the sense previously described and otherwise takes value 
0.Three interactive fixed effects allow for (a) the base level of imports of any product from any 
country ( Pr ijCountry oduct ), (b) the overall imports from any country into Japan in any 
period( itCountryPeriod ), and (c) the overall imports of any product into Japan in any period 
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( Pr jtoductPeriod ). There is no need to include uninteracted variables because those effects are 
absorbed into the three interactive fixed effects. The estimation result is in Table 4 The first column 
shows a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.457, indicating that the DFQF initiative had 
positive impacts on LDCs’ exports to Japan.  
Because Japan is far from most LDC countries, the effect of Japan’s DFQF system might be different 
between Asian LDCs and non-Asian LDCs, which are almost exclusively located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Thus, the estimation was performed with the Asian LDC dummy; results are shown in the 
second column of Table 4. The coefficient estimate for Asian LDC treatment is positive and 
statistically significant. The effect for Asian LDCs is more positive and statistically significant than 
the effect for LDCs without Asian countries. The total effect of the DFQF initiative for Asian LDCs 
is 0.231+0.397=0.628). 
=== Table 4 === 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF TRIPLE DIFFERENCE ESTIMATION 
 The result in Table 4 seems to square the prediction that the LDCs benefited from DFQF access to 
the Japanese market, especially Asian LDCs because of their geographical proximity. To check the 
robustness of the result in Table 4, we have performed the same triple difference estimation, with 
some changes in the time dimension (year) and tariff lines. First, different time periods from the above 
bench-mark triple difference estimator are taken. Now, the time is divided into the one for the years 
from 1996 to 2005 and the other for the years from 2006 to 2014 (column (i) of Table 5), as the DFQF 
initiative was agreed in December 2005. Second, MFN tariff lines which have zero tariff rates were 
dropped from the dataset. For products whose MFN tariffs are zero, there is no preference for LDCs 
(column (ii) of Table 5). Third, both changes, i.e., the newly defined time dimension (year) and the 
tariff lines excluding zero MFN rate goods are incorporated. (column (iii) of Table 5).  
===  Table 5=== 
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With the altered time period, the coefficient estimate for LDC treatment remains statistically 
significant and positive, but with a smaller magnitude (column (i) of Table 5). The coefficient 
estimate is now 0.160 while it is 0.457 in the benchmark case (Table 4). When we add Asian LDC 
treatment, the coefficient estimate for Asian LDC treatment is positive and statistically significant 
while the coefficient estimate for LDC treatment covariate turns insignificant. These results seem 
compatible with the descriptive analyses in Figure 4 and Figure 5, in which the positive impact of 
DFQF initiative seems to have taken place in 2001-2008 period, rather than the later period. Turning 
our eyes to products without zero MFNs, the estimation (ii), the estimation results are almost the same 
with the benchmark results in Table 4. Estimation (iii) shows similar results to those in (i).  
6. CONCLUSION 
This study evaluates the impact of the DFQF access given to LDCs by Japan. The construction of 
concordance tables and algorism for Japan's 9-digit tariff line codes for a 19-year period makes 
feasible an analysis at the tariff line level and thereby overcomes a possible aggregation bias. The 
exogenous nature of DFQF access alleviates potential endogeneity problems. We show that Japan 
granted the duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to the LDC countries for all products by the year 
2008. The triple difference estimator shows that LDCs, especially Asian LDCs, benefited from DFQF 
access to the Japanese market. Namely, tariff lines which were granted zero tariffs and substantial 
preference margins over other countries resulted in successful imports into the Japanese market. The 
effect is especially prominent for the pre-financial crisis period and for the Asian LDC countries. We 
conjecture that the stronger effect on the Asian LDC countries is attributable to other assistance of 
technical (trade procedures) or physical (infrastructures) by the Japanese government to the Asian 
countries, but are left to be investigated in future research.  
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Figure 1: Number of zero tariff lines by year 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
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Figure 2: Import value by country group and year 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff and trade data. 
Figure 3: Import value by country group and year with BRICs separated 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff and trade data 
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Figure 4: Import value of non-treated group tariff lines, by country group 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff and trade data 
Figure 5: Import value of treated group tariff lines, by country group 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff and trade data 
Table 1: Number of tariff lines with more than 10% or20% preference margin 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
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Table 2: Number of tariff lines with more than 10% preference margin, by industry 
HS 
2-digit 
code HS 2-digit description 
Number of tariff lines 
with preference 
margin of more than 
10% over GSP tariff 
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants. 152 
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted. 127 
04 
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal 
origin, not elsewhere specified or included. 126 
19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products. 105 
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted. 86 
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. 74 
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles, 64 
11 Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten. 52 
16 
Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic 
invertebrates. 35 
02 Meat and edible meat offal. 34 
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 24 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 24 
50 Silk. 24 
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers. 22 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 20 
41 Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather. 19 
15 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared 
edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 16 
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons. 14 
03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates. 11 
12 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; 
industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder. 8 
09 Coffee, tea, mate and spices. 7 
10 Cereals. 7 
42 
Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and 
similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk-worm gut). 7 
43 Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof. 7 
63 
Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile 
articles; rags. 6 
23 Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder. 3 
01 Live animals. 2 
13 Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts. 2 
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 2 
25 Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement. 1 
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal, 1 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
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Table 3: Number of tariff lines, with duplicates, imported into Japan 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
  
How many tariff lines were imported (running number)
years Treated lines Untreated lines Treated lines Untreated lines Treated lines Untreated lines
1996 56 477 1428 13317 3368 39291
1997 47 549 1450 14092 3392 39774
1998 59 568 1411 13803 3323 38951
1999 54 649 1481 14016 3311 38205
2000 62 689 1558 14882 3434 38996
2001 60 722 1643 15481 3517 39859
2002 66 737 1726 15678 3457 39798
2003 63 706 1741 16076 3470 39943
2004 61 779 1797 16667 3454 40426
2005 88 816 1945 17219 3461 40728
2006 72 851 1878 17507 3494 40754
2007 83 846 1870 17691 3402 40658
2008 90 869 1846 17686 3210 39379
2009 91 852 1789 16756 3092 36701
2010 95 894 1805 17011 3127 36850
2011 113 962 1822 17557 3192 37364
2012 104 1114 1898 17943 3256 37182
2013 130 1251 1937 18357 3356 38586
2014 141 1339 1966 18671 3415 38899
LDC non-LDC GSP REST
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Table 4: Estimation result of triple difference 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness check of triple difference analysis 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from tariff data. 
  
 (1) (2) 
Ineffect_LDC_Treated 0.457*** 0.231*** 
 (20.53) (6.91) 
lneffect_AsianLDC_Treated  0.397*** 
  (8.87) 
Country period dummy Yes Yes 
Product period dummy Yes Yes 
Country product dummy Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.894 0.894 
Number of observations 1563745 1563745 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lneffect_LDC 0.160*** 0.0446 0.469*** 0.294*** 0.117*** 0.0497 
treated (6.91) (1.29) (21.55) (9.02) (5.17) (1.47) 
lneffect_AsianLDC  0.203***  0.302***  0.117** 
treated  (4.37)  (6.91)  (2.57) 
Country period 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product period 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country product 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.887 0.887 0.894 0.894 0.887 0.887 
Number of 
observations 
1563745 1563745 1128081 1128081 1127999 1127999 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX 
9-digit code concordance 
We need to track Japan’s 9-digit tariff codes that change every year. Adjusting the concordance 
algorism originally proposed by Pierce and Schott (2009) for US tariff codes to our case of the 
Japanese HS codes, we have made concordance table over years. Pierce and Schott (2009) refers HS 
codes concordance relationship as “family trees”, which can be described as the appendix figure 1 
and 2 below.  
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
t t+1 t+2 
t t+1 t+2 
g 
e 
f 
a 
b 
c 
d 
Appendix figure 1: Growing family tree 
Appendix figure 2: Shrinking family tree 
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As these figures illustrate, there are some codes which disappear and others which appear over years, 
which are called “obsolete” codes and “new” codes, respectively. In the case of the US, the US 
customs office prepares the obsolete-new tables over years. Our first task was to construct the 
obsolete-new tables for the Japanese case. Obsolete-new list for a single year is gone public by Japan 
customs, under the Ministry of Finance. But these Obsolete-new lists simply show which HS codes 
are generated (“new”) or which are deleted (obsolete). Therefore, we painstakingly checked HS codes 
one by one and made obsolete-new comparison tables over years. 
While there are about 9000 HS 9-digit codes for each year before concordance, in the process of 
concordance, many codes are grouped into “code families”, and thus we are left with approximately 
8000 tariff lines over 19 years (1996-2014) after the concordance, and there are about 1000 tariff lines 
in every year that are the candidate of concordance HS codes. 
However, if we limit our analysis to periods within the same HS version, such as HS 2002, which 
covers 2002–2006, or HS 2007, which covers 2007–2011, substantially more than 8000 tariff line 
codes remain. Our investigation on the number of consistent tariff line codes between two subsequent 
years has shown that within the same HS version, the matching rate is about 99%; this rate drops to 
about 75-80% between years belonging to two different HS versions, such as 2001 and 2002. To 
strike a balance between the benefits and costs of concordance, this paper has made concordance 
tables between 1996 - 2014 (which uses HS concordance table from HS1996 to 2002, 2002 to 2006, 
2006 to 2007, and Japanese 9 digit’s HS obsolete-new lists by every year). Among years within the 
same HS version, only the matched codes are kept.  
More in-depth explanation for the algorism and procedures can be provided upon request to the 
authors. 
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List of LDC countries 
Angola Mali 
Bangladesh Mauritania 
Benin Mozambique 
Bhutan Myanmar
Burkina Faso Nepal 
Burundi Niger 
Cambodia Rwanda
Central African Republic Samoa 
Chad Sao Tome and Principe 
Union of Comoros Senegal
Democratic Republic of Congo Sierra Leone 
Djibouti Commonwealth of Dominica Solomon Islands 
Equatorial Guinea Somalia
Eritrea Sudan 
Ethiopia Tanzania 
Gambia Timor Leste 
Guinea Togo 
Guinea-Bissau Tuvalu 
Haiti Uganda 
Kiribati Vanuatu 
Laos Yemen 
Lesotho Zambia 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi  
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List of GSP beneficiary countries 
 
Afghanistan Gambia Niue
Albania Georgia Pakistan 
Algeria Ghana Palau
American Samoa Gibraltar Panama 
Angola Grenada Papua New Guinea 
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Paraguay
Argentina Guinea Peru 
Armenia Guinea-Bissau Philippines
Azerbaijan Guyana Rwanda
Bangladesh Haiti Samoa 
Belarus Honduras Sao Tome and Principe 
Belize India Senegal
Benin Indonesia Serbia 
Bhutan Iran Seychelles 
Bolivia Iraq Sierra Leone 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Côte d’Ivoire Solomon Islands 
Botswana Jamaica Somalia
Brazil Jordan South Africa
British Anguila Kazakhstan Sri Lanka 
British Virgin Islands Kenya St. Christopher and Nevis 
Burkina Faso Kiribati St. Helena and Dependencies
Burundi Kyrgyz St. Lucia 
Cambodia Laos St. Vincent
Cameroon Lebanon Sudan 
Canary Islands Lesotho Suriname 
Cape Verde Liberia Swaziland 
Central African Republic Libya Syria 
Ceuta and Melilla Macedonia (former Yugoslavia) Tajikistan 
Chad Madagascar Tanzania 
China (except for Hong Kong and Macao) Malawi Thailand
Chile Malaysia Timor Leste 
Colombia Maldives Togo 
Union of Comoros Mali Tokelau Islands 
Democratic Republic of Congo Marshall Islands Tonga
Republic of Congo Mauritania Tunisia 
Cook Islands Mauritius Turkey 
Costa Rica Mexico Turkmenista
Cuba Micronesia Turks and Caicos Islands 
Croatia Moldova Tuvalu 
Djibouti Commonwealth of Dominica Mongolia Uganda 
Dominican Republic Montenegro Ukraine 
Ecuador Montserrat Uruguay
Egypt Morocco Uzbekistan 
El Salvador Mozambique Vanuatu 
Equatorial Guinea Myanmar Venezuela
Eritrea Namibia Viet-Nam 
Ethiopia Nepal West Bank and Gaza Strip
Falkland Islands and Dependencies Nicaragua Yemen 
Fiji Niger Zambia 
Gabon Nigeria Zimbabwe
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